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1. Introduction 
A Green Paper on PPPs was published by the EC (DG Markt) on 30 April 2004 1. It is related to a series of 
papers that seek to develop the Commission’s position on how the private sector can operate in public 
services.  These include reports from DG Markt, DG Regio and Eurostat (the statistical arm of the EC) that 
seek to encourage PPPs as a way of raising investment, through financial and administrative incentives, with 
the encouragement of private interests which stand to gain from PPPs. Other public interests concerns are not 
addressed by these approaches, but are of great importance, including the fundamental question of whether 
PPPs are a better way of financing investment public services than the public sector. 
2. One-sided approach: promoting PPPs 
The background to the Green Paper is a series of initiatives aimed at extending the role of the private sector 
in public services, promoting PPPs, and especially ensuring that PPPs have access to public funds. These 
initiatives have come from a number of divisions of the EC, with the support of the private sector. They are 
motivated by a wish to expand the internal market into public services, use PPPs as a way of avoiding fiscal 
restraints, and providing the private sector with more business. 
2.1. Extending internal market into public services 
The main origin of the paper is DG Markt’s current strategy for developing the internal market of the EU, set 
out in May 2003, which prioritises public services as the next sectors for liberalisation2. Part of that strategy 
is “to facilitate public-private partnerships”, based on the belief that “The private sector will play an 
increasingly important role in financing infrastructure and in modernising our vital services and ensuring 
that they are affordable and of the highest possible quality.” The strategy promised a  
Green Paper to “ensure that such partnerships are compatible with public procurement rules”, as well as to 
clarify the relationship between PPPs and state aid rules, as part of a general commitment to review EU 
legislation in order to facilitate the greater role of the private sector in public services. 3  The paper also 
addresses the issue of the current exemption from procurement rules of concessions, which are the oldest 
form of PPP: this has been the subject of previous communications from the EC.4 
2.2. Promoting PPPs in accession countries: accessing EC funds 
DG Regio has also published papers that are concerned to support and facilitate the use of PPPs, especially in 
new member states and accession countries, so that the grants for investment in environmental and transport 
infrastructure can be available to PPPs. The first DG Regio paper, in 2003, was a guide to “developing 
successful PPP projects in the candidate countries” so that they were compatible with the rules for providing 
ISPA funds, stating that “The European Commission has an interest in promoting and developing PPPs 
within the framework of the grants it provides” 5. In June 2004 DG Regio published a collection of case 
studies intended to demonstrate that “it is possible to successfully manage these constraints [of ISPA and 
cohesion fund rules] and integrate the needs of all parties”.  6 
                                                     
1 Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions. COM(2004) 
327 final. Brussels 30.04.2004 .  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/ppp/greenpaper/com-2004-327_en.pdf  
2 Internal Market Strategy Priorities 2003 – 2006 . Communication From The Commission May 2003 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/strategy/index.htm  
3  Speech by Commissioner Frits Bolkestein Member of the European Commission in charge of the Internal Market and 
Taxation , at the 3d annual Public-Private Partnership Global Summit Holland, Noordijk, 08 November 2002: 
“European Commission's current policy on public-private partnerships and its future projects”  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/speeches/021108-bolkestein_en.htm  
4 Commission Interpretative Communication on Concessions in Community law, OJ C 121, 29.4.2000, p. 2. 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2000/c_12120000429en.html  
5 Guide to Successful Public-Private Partnerships . DG Regio  March 2003 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppguide.htm  
6   Resource Book On PPP Case Studies. DG Regio June 2004.    
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/pppguide.htm  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
29/07/2010  Page 4 of 4  
  
2.3. Eurostat: easing conditions for fiscal exemption 
A key motive for public authorities’ interest in PPPs, as stated in the green paper, is that PPPs are seen as 
enabling governments, constrained by the EU’s own fiscal rules, to make more investments in public 
services: “In view of the budget constraints confronting Member States, it meets a need for private funding 
for the public sector…”.  
 
The problem however has been a lack of clarity over the circumstances in which PPPs are officially 
recognised as being outside the categories of public borrowing and public assets and debts that are 
constrained by the EU rules. This has been considerably eased, for supporters of PPPs, by a ruling by 
Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the EC, in February 2004, that the assets involved in a PPP should be 
classified as non-government assets, and therefore recorded off balance sheet for government, if the private 
partner bears the construction risk, and the private partner bears either availability or demand risk. 7 This is 
an easy requirement – availability risk simply means that the private sector accepts responsibility if its own 
asset stops working at a time when it is needed. 
2.4. EC support for PPP financing of international transport links 
The EC itself is encouraging PPP schemes as a way of financing the large-scale capital investment needed 
for the planned trans-European networks. A report from the commission in 2003 8 proposed that more use 
could be made of concessions for this purpose, referring to historical precedents. This report saw the purpose 
of the Green Paper on PPPs as being “to launch a major public consultation regarding the rapid 
development of various forms of PPP and the legal regulation of public contracts through Community law.” 
2.5. Private sector encouragement 
The expansion of PPPs is naturally supported and encouraged by the private companies that gain from the 
growth in such projects, especially in sectors such as water and construction of transport links such as roads 
and tunnels. The market for the private sector grows as PPPs replace public sector investment and operation, 
and this is an especially attractive market where it can be combined with government guarantees that secure 
the returns on investment, and with access to EC level grants that increase the total value of schemes. A good 
summary of this market-seeking approach can be seen in the paper published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 
June 2004 9,  which sees PPPs as an important market, seeks greater certainty about EU rules on 
procurement and funding in relation to PPPs, and recommends that the EU funds the creation of special PPP 
units, and a central EU task force to assist member states “tackle the issues involved in integrating EU 
funding and grant requirements with private sector finance and PPP approaches”.   
2.6. The other side: economic and social concerns with PPPs 
This encouragement for PPPs however ignores a range of concerns about PPPs based on public interest 
considerations. Most fundamentally, there are questions about whether PPPs should be preferred to public 
sector investment and operation of services, and the need to evaluate the social and economic impact of the 
risks and future liabilities created by PPPs. There are a number of specific public interest concerns: about the 
way PPPs transfer the costs of paying for investment from present generation to future generations; about the 
dangers of fragmenting, casualising and worsening conditions of employment of public service workers 
employed in them; about the transparency of the processes by which PPPs are established, operated, and 
                                                     
7   New decision of Eurostat on deficit and debt Treatment of public-private partnerships  11/02/2004  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/04/18&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en  
8   Developing the trans-European transport network: Innovative funding solutions; Interoperability of electronic toll 
collection systems: Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on 
the widespread introduction and interoperability of electronic road toll systems in the Community. 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Brussels, 23.4.2003. COM(2003) 132 final 2003/0081 (COD). 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/themes/network/doc/com_2003_0132_en.pdf  
9  Developing Public Private Partnerships in New Europe. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. May 2004 .          
http://www.pwcglobal.com/ie/eng/about/svcs/corp_finance/pwc_ppp04.pdf ; an executive summary is at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/service.nsf/docid/6FDD654BE69A4B3385256BDC00527C30/$file/pwc
_PPP_Exec_Summ.pdf  
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terminated, including the dangers of corruption; and about the comparative economic consequences of PPPs 
and public sector options. 
2.7. Green Paper and beyond 
This paper starts with some comments about the Green Paper itself and some of its recommendations, and 
then raises some key issues concerning PPPs, including the need for an assessment of how PPPs impact on 
public interests, and the ability of public authorities to come to the best decisions for the public interest.  
 
3. The Green Paper 
3.1. Missing the procurement directives 
There is a general question about the relationship between the Green Paper (GP) and EC policy initiatives. 
The bulk of the paper is concerned with possible changes to the public procurement regime of the EU, yet it 
was published one month after the enactment of the new, comprehensively revised procurement directives 
2004/17 and 2004/18.10  The Green Paper itself had been delayed 18 months from its originally announced 
date. The opportunity of including relevant provisions in the revised directives has thus been lost: any 
changes relating to PPPs would need a further revision to the directive. 
3.2. Concessions 
At present, concessions fall outside the scope of the procurement directives, which leaves many major 
contracts not subject to full rigours of competitive tendering. There is a public interest in such competition, 
however, to help avoid corruption and favouritism, and it is a serious anomaly that major contracts in water 
supply or toll roads should not be subject to these rules. It is therefore welcome that the GP argues that 
service concessions should be subject to tendering rules like other contracts, and suggests that EC legislation 
should impose this requirement (paras 31-36).  Previous EC communications on concessions had been 
prepared to allow the current favoured regime to continue. 
3.3. Structured selection methods and ‘competitive dialogue’ 
The GP also makes a strong statement of principle of the public interest in rigorous procurement procedures, 
even in relation to PPPs : “structured selection methods should be protected in all circumstances, as these 
contribute to the objectivity and integrity of the procedure leading to the selection of an operator. This in 
turn guarantees the sound use of public funds, reduces the risk of practices that lack transparency and 
strengthens the legal certainty necessary for such projects.” (para 26).  Unfortunately, this is in the context 
of a discussion of the new ‘competitive dialogue’ procedure of the revised procurement directive (article 29), 
which does not exhibit many of these virtues: it allows confidential discussions with tenderers after the 
contract notice has been issued, and even after the best tender has been identified.  The time for DG Markt to 
insist on rigour was before the introduction of this kind of ‘dialogue’ into the directive. 
3.4. First movers: a recipe for corruption? 
The Green Paper endorses proposals that ‘first movers’ should have some privileged treatment to maintain 
the incentive to initiate proposals for public spending on their projects. (paras 37-41). Such proposals have 
always been made b y private companies in the hope of the proposer getting extra contracts, or less 
competitive contracts (not, as naively suggested in para 39 “to develop or apply innovate technical solutions, 
suited to the particular needs of the contracting body”). There are serious dangers in these initiatives, not 
least of corruption and higher costs from the resulting contracts precisely because they are less rigorously 
scrutinised and subjected to competition and evaluation of alternatives, as a recent World Bank paper 
warned, concluding: “The many negative experiences with unsolicited proposals for private infrastructure 
                                                     
10 DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 on 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts Official Journal of the European Union EN 30.4.2004 L 134/133  http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_134/l_13420040430en01140240.pdf  
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projects may lead some governments to see blanket refusals as the only way to safeguard against potential 
problems with corruption and lack of transparency.”.11 The GP should take heed of that advice. 
3.5. Sub-contracting 
The GP rightly raises the question of sub-contracting as creating potential problems (paras. 51-52). Sub-
contracting in its various forms has led to worsening of conditions, loss of training and unreliable and 
dangerous work in many public services in many countries -  the examples of the Hatfield train crash in the 
UK, and the recent collapse of the airport building at Charles de Gaulle airport in France, both illustrate the 
dangers of this practice.  These problems are general to all sub-contracting, however, whereas the Green 
Paper considers them only in the context of whether a PPP partner can restrict sub-contracting to its own 
affiliates. 
3.6. Proposal of compulsory tendering of public sector work 
The Green Paper includes a paragraph (para 63) that claims that work has to be submitted to compulsory 
tendering before it can be assigned to arms-length public entities, referring to one of the cases heard by the 
ECJ that affects this issue.  The para asserts that: “Only entities that fulfil these two conditions at the same 
time [subject to the same kind of control as an in-house entity, and carrying out the essential part of its work 
for the authority] may be treated as equivalent to "in-house" entities in relation to the contracting body and 
have tasks entrusted to them without a competitive procedure.”    
 
If applied, this policy would seriously distort the choices available to public authorities.  Inter-municipal 
companies, and similar arms-length corporatised public sector bodies, have often been developed to take 
advantage of perceived economies of scale, accounting and managerial disciplines analogous to the private 
sector, and an ability to borrow without being constrained by the EU limits on government borrowing and 
debt (which do not apply to public sector trading entities).  The Green Paper’s policy would rule these out as 
policy options, as any such arms-length form would have to be subject to tender against commercial private 
operators able to make strategic bids and operate cross-subsidies between divisions (as was done by all major 
refuse collection contractors entering the UK market under the Thatcher compulsory tendering regime in 
1989 (and, in the other direction, by Vivendi in 2000, when it loaded all the debts of its acquisitions in 
telecoms and media onto its existing concessions in water, waste and other public services). The 
development of the public sector would be strangled by removing such arms-length options.  
 
The GP’s position threatens to force compulsory tendering on a high percentage of public sector operators, 
and is highly contentious: it has no place in a Green Paper that is supposed to be concerned with PPPs.  
 
While this would be a welcome development from the point of view of private contractors seeking to capture 
business from the public sector, it is not a welcome development for public authorities, as it reduces their 
ability to choose the best option for public services.  
3.7. Definitions 
The PPPs Green Paper states that the term PPP is not defined at Community level, and then goes on to give a 
remarkably vague account of the elements normally characterising PPPs. However, a definition in the EC 
report on EMU in 2003 refers to more precise characteristics. The recent IMF paper also provides more 
technically specific definition, based on the elements of a Design, Build, Finance and Operation (DBFO) 
contract; a similar approach to an earlier PSIRU definition (see Annexe 1) 
 
While it is correct that the term PPP is used to cover a wide variety of arrangements, any policy-oriented 
paper needs to provide itself with precise terms that define its subject matter and what it is acting upon.  The 
definitions in paras 1 and 2 include the vague phrase: “forms of cooperation between public authorities and 
the world of business” with six alternative objectives. This is far too wide a definition, and would include for 
                                                     
11   Unsolicited proposals : the issues for private infrastructure projects. John Hiodges. Public Policy for the Private 
Sector. Note no 257. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/08/19/000160016_20030819180828/Rendered/PDF/26
3990PAPER0VP0no10257.pdf  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
29/07/2010  Page 7 of 7  
  
example joint seminars.  This is followed by a list of four elements, which are the “relatively” long duration 
– relative to what?  Funding partly from the private sector “sometimes by means of complex arrangements”; 
the “important role” of the economic operator; and the “distribution of risks” – which is a feature of any 
contract. 12 
 
More precise definitions are already available, for example in the EC report Public finances in EMU 2003, or 
the IMF paper on PPPs, which defines the category as projects involving the private partner in DBFO of an 
asset, which constitutes a clear framework for discussion. 
3.8. Private and public interests: encouraging PPPs and private ownership 
The public interests in the subject are most fundamentally concerned with getting the best option for 
investment, and the best option for operating a service. There are also other public interests and policies, 
some specified in the treaty, such as the freedom for companies to compete with each other throughout the 
EU, but also the community objectives of quality public services, high employment etc.  
 
There are also private interests at stake with PPPs. There is the natural interest of contractors in relevant 
sectors in maximising the size of the market available to them, which would be achieved by increasing the 
use of PPPs for public investment.  There is a similar natural interest from financiers, who are interested in a 
potentially larger market for investment finance that may be secured by government guarantees. It is to be 
expected that these groups will seek to encourage the use of PPPs, on terms as favourable as possible to 
themselves. 
 
Private interests are not the same as the public interest objective of fair competition. That objective can be 
sought whether there are 2 PPPs in Europe, or 2 million. There is no public interest in increasing the number 
of PPPs for their own sake.  The Green Paper however acts as though this was the case: section 1.2 is headed 
“The challenge for the Internal Market: to facilitate the development of PPPs under conditions of effective 
competition and legal clarity.” : while it is a matter of public policy for the EC to aim for effective 
competition (and of course legal clarity), there is no public policy objective to facilitate the development of 
PPPs.  The same mistake occurs elsewhere (paras 14,16, 19) which talk of “obstacles” to PPPs, “develop” 
PPPs, “remove barriers” to PPPs.   
 
3.8.1. Not neutral on public or private 
One reason why this matters is because of the importance of the Treaty’s principle of neutrality on public or 
private ownership (under article 295 of the Treaty). At one point the Green Paper claims that it does not 
make any “value judgment” on the decision whether or not to externalise services (para 17), arguing that the 
rules it is concerned with apply “downstream of the economic and organisational choice made by a local or 
national authority” on whether to use the private sector.  But encouraging PPPs, removing obstacles to them, 
clearly implies discouraging the alternative, of using the public sector.  
 
It also involves a preference for private ownership. The asset financed by a PPP needs to be classified as a  
private asset, off the public sector balance sheet, and so escapes the curbs on government debt. Encouraging 
PPPs entails encouraging the formation of privately owned assets over the alternative of publicly owned 
assets. This seems, in principle, a breach of the treaty’s neutrality. 13 
 
                                                     
12 This vagueness is consistent with an approach based on the private interest of expanding the market – to those 
interested in market opportunities, it does not matter much exactly what are the features of the contract. 
13 This preference is also implicit in the fiscal rules of the growth and stability pact themselves. 
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4. Beyond the Green Paper: evaluating PPPs against public interest 
4.1. Two central comparative questions 
The two elements of a PPP are normally (1) financing a public sector capital investment project through a 
private company; (2) a contract for services, usually operating the capital assets financed under (1).The two 
central questions on PPPs, for public authorities, are therefore: 
- Is the PPP a better way of financing the capital investment involved than alternatives? 
- Is the PPP a better way of operating the service than alternatives? 
 
Both the IMF and the EC report on EMU 2003 agree that the key questions are these comparative ones. They 
stand at the peak of a decision-tree, where the public authority can evaluate options for carrying out a public 
service involving design, building, and financing  some capital assets, and operating the service. (DBFO).  
Thus the key choice is between public sector provision and a PPP, or other variants on these options, as the  
IMF insists: “When considering the PPP option, the government has to compare the cost of public 
investment and government provision of services with the cost of services provided by a PPP” (PPPs, para 
23).  
Chart A: Different levels of decision on the best way to achieve public service objectives 
 
 
 
DG Markt’s Green Paper however largely ignores these key questions, and assumes that a PPP has been 
chosen as the way forward.  It acknowledges that “recourse to PPPs cannot be presented as a miracle 
solution for a public sector facing budget constraints. Experience shows that, for each project, it is necessary 
to assess whether the partnership option offers real value added compared with other options…” (para 5).  
However, it fails to discuss these other options, and does not elaborate at any point on how this assessment 
should be carried out, or on what principles such an evaluation should be made. Ignoring this top level 
choice is dangerously similar to assuming, with Mrs Thatcher, that “there is no alternative” (TINA).   
 
As a result, the paper easily slips into claiming that the point is to encourage PPPs, and remove obstacles to 
them: but doing this may have the effect of distorting the higher level choice, for example by offering 
guarantees to entice private contractors.   
 
This weakness can be seen in their discussion of risk. The comparative question addressed by others is 
whether the PPP option carries more risks (and benefits) than the alternatives of public sector provision (or 
other forms of contracting).  So the question of guarantees for example is treated by the IMF as a 
comparative one e.g. “it is also possible that the government overprices risk and overcompensates the 
private sector for taking it on, which would raise the cost of PPPs relative to direct public investment”14.  
The Green Paper however ignores this comparison, and discusses the question of how risks are distributed 
                                                     
14 International Monetary Fund Public-Private Partnerships March 12, 2004 p.14 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.htm 
Public service 
DBFO
Public sector PPP
Specification 
and Contract
Contractor A
Contractor B
Contractor C
Total 
privatisation
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within a PPP, as a search for the ‘best’ allocation between the public and private partners: “In this context, 
the appropriate assessment and optimum distribution of the risks between the public and the private sectors, 
according to their respective ability to assume these risks, is crucial.” (para 45).   
 
4.2. Making PPPs too easy  
In the context of this choice it is important that PPPs are not made too easy or attractive, e.g. by offering 
exemption from fiscal restraint, or from procurement disciplines, or providing state-backed guarantees which 
are not properly costed. These inducements would distort any evaluation between a PPP and a public sector 
provision.  
 
Thus the Eurostat ruling, which is noted by the Green Paper as helping make PPPs more attractive, should 
rather be criticised for making PPPs too easy. This is the view taken by the IMF, in March 2004, when it 
described the Eurostat decision as “problematic” 15, and declared that the “recent Eurostat decision on 
accounting for risk transfer gives considerable cause for concern , because it is likely to result in most PPPs 
being classified as private investment. …. Since most PPPs involve the private sector bearing construction 
and availability risk, they will probably be treated as private investment, even though the government bears 
substantial demand risk (e.g., when it guarantees to the private operator a minimum level of demand for the 
service provided through the PPP). …the recent decision …. thus could provide an incentive for EU 
governments to resort to PPPs mainly to circumvent the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) fiscal 
constraints.”  16   
 
This echoed the general concern expressed in the EC’s own report on EMU in 2003 (produced before the 
Eurostat ruling): “there is the risk that the recourse to PPPs is increasingly motivated instead by the purpose 
of putting capital spending outside government budgets, in order to bypass budgetary constraints. If this is 
the case, then it may happen that PPPs are carried out even when they are more costly than purely public 
investment.” (summary of part III, p.102) 17  
 
These anxieties may be predictable on the part of fiscal authorities, but they form part of a wider debate 
about the appropriateness of those policies themselves.  The EMU 2003 report devoted a whole section to the 
question of public investment, how it is affected by PPPs, and whether the  fiscal rules of the EU are 
constraining public investment and, if so, whether they should be changed.  The IMF papers of March 2004 
have a similar agenda, and indeed the IMF has proposed a significant alteration in its own fiscal rules, 
precisely in order to facilitate public investment by public authorities and public sector operators.   
 
If the fiscal rules of the EU  (or the IMF) are preventing enough public investment from being made, or 
preventing it being made in the most efficient way – as both bodies acknowledge may be happening -  then 
the rules themselves need to be reviewed and changed. Evading the rules by using PPPs, when they may be a 
more costly, more risky, less equitable and less effective option than public provision, does not solve the 
problem: it makes it worse.   
4.3. Capital investment: private borrowing is more expensive 
The Green Paper, as stated above, shares the view that PPPs are helpful because they allow public 
investment outside the fiscal guidelines. The report on EMU 2003 points out two crucial weaknesses in this 
position: the by-passing of better alternatives, and the failure to make a long-term assessment of the 
implications of PPPs: “First, it does not address why PPPs should be preferred to alternative schemes to 
finance capital formation with public purposes that do not imply an increase in government borrowing (for 
                                                     
15  International Monetary Fund Public-Private Partnerships March 12, 2004 para 38 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.htm  
16 International Monetary Fund Public Investment and Fiscal Policy  March 12, 2004 para 36  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/PIFP.pdf  
17  European Economy No 3 / 2003 Issn 0379-0991 European Commission Directorate-General For Economic And 
Financial Affairs.  Public finances in EMU 2003 
   http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2003/ee303en.pdf  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
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example, classical privatisation [author’s note: or borrowing through a corporatised public sector entity, 
which is also outside the EU definition of government borrowing]). Second, even if the impact on current 
budget balances of PPP schemes is most likely to be smaller compared with the alternative of pure public 
procurement, the long-term impact of PPPs on public finances is to be assessed carefully.” 18  PPPs have to 
be demonstrated to be a better option than other ways of investing and delivering the same service.  
 
PPPs have a fundamental disadvantage as a way of financing capital expenditure, compared with finance 
raised by government borrowing: governments can invariably borrow money more cheaply than any private 
company, As the IMF puts it; “private sector borrowing generally costs more than government borrowing. 
….. This being the case, when PPPs result in private borrowing being substituted for government borrowing, 
financing costs will in most cases rise ...”19  This means that the PPP has to demonstrate that there are 
significant efficiency gains from involving the private sector, in order to offset the borrowing costs. The 
EMU 2003 report agrees: “The rationale for the use of PPP schemes is rather that of microeconomic 
efficiency.”  
4.4. The efficiency argument 
The Green Paper has nothing to say on the subject of efficiency.  It assumes from the outset that the public 
sector will benefit “from the know-how and working methods of the private sector.” (para 4) but does not at 
any stage justify this. But there is no systematic evidence that the private sector is more efficient than the 
public sector.  The IMF, by contrast, is aware that the evidence does not support a general assumption of 
superior private sector efficiency:  “Much of the case for PPPs rests on the relative efficiency of the private 
sector. While there is an extensive literature on this subject, the theory is ambiguous and the empirical 
evidence is mixed.” 20 
 
A good summary of this mixed evidence is contained in a review by Finnish economist Johann Willner of 
empirical evidence from comparative studies in a range of sectors. This shows that public ownership is at 
least as efficient in more than half of the studies, and developed a theoretical analysis that concludes that 
political intervention may actually produce better results in oligopolistic markets, even if it creates ‘over-
manning’.21 And in infrastructure sectors where monopoly is common and competition in the market is 
weak, there is little theoretical justification for the normal presumption that competition makes the private 
sector more efficient.  
4.5. Long-term impact: guarantees and contingent liabilities 
Both the IMF and the  EMU 2003 report note the importance of assessing the real value of the contingent 
liabilities taken on by governments through the various guarantees commonly offered to PPPs. The EMU 
report notes that “given the possible relevant debt impact of contingent liabilities, the inclusion of 
information (also quantitative when possible) on each provision giving raise to contingent liabilities in 
supplementary budgetary documents is recommended in international codes of fiscal transparency”  (5.3.3, 
p.131).    
 
The use of government guarantees in PPPs is also an extra burden on the public authorities, which should be 
taken into account when comparing them with other possible options. The IMF paper notes that : “….resort 
to guarantees to secure private financing can expose the government to hidden and often higher costs than 
traditional public financing….” (PPPs para 40).  The use of government guarantees is also an obvious 
potential source of corruption, if politicians or public officials are induced to provide guarantees that protect 
the private partner but offer no benefit to the public. To try and make guarantees more transparent,  the IMF 
proposes that the public policy objectives and the intended beneficiaries of all guarantees should be stated: 
“Good disclosure practice is to publish detailed information on guarantees. This should cover the public 
policy purpose of each guarantee or guarantee program, the total amount of the guarantee classified by sector 
                                                     
18 EMU 2003 The economics of PPPs, p.129 
19  IMF PPPs, para 22 
20  IMF PPPs, para 25 
21 Johan Willner, “Ownership, efficiency, and political interference”, in European Journal of Political Economy, vol.17, 
no. 4, (2001), pp.723-748 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
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and duration, the intended beneficiaries, and the likelihood that the guarantee will be called. Information 
should also be provided on past calls of guarantees.” 22 Both the IMF 23 and the OECD 24 have produced 
codes on fiscal transparency that require these liabilities to be clearly stated. 
 
In 2002 the government of China took the decision not to offer any kind of guarantees in future to 
international companies operating in China. This poses a more fundamental question, as to why the EC, and 
European governments, in a supposedly more liberalised market, regard state guarantees for private operators 
as acceptable. It has been pointed out that in the UK, “future service payments under PFI contracts amount to 
an explicit off-balance-sheet liability totalling £100 billion which has significant implications for future 
borrowing or taxes.25   
 
5. Long-term effects on provision of services 
5.1. Uncertainty and incomplete contracts 
A problem with all outsourcing is the uncertainty of the future, which means that contractual relations have 
to be renegotiated, limiting the range of options and flexibility of the public authority. The Green Paper takes 
the view that what happens after the contract can be determined by provisions in the contract itself, and in 
this way the allocation of risks can be defined and controlled:  “The success of a PPP depends to a large 
extent on a comprehensive contractual framework for the project, and on the optimum definition of the 
elements which will govern its implementation. In this context, the appropriate assessment and optimum 
distribution of the risks between the public and the private sectors, according to their respective ability to 
assume these risks, is crucial.” (para 45) 
 
There are two great weaknesses in this position. Firstly, it ignores the key ‘top-level’ choice between public 
provision or PPPs – the key question is not allocation of risk within PPPs, but the riskiness of PPPs 
compared with the alternative of public sector provision. Secondly, in reality it is impossible to specify 
everything in a contract, because unforeseen circumstances will arise.  
 
This is a key reason why businesses are vertically integrated instead of outsourcing core activities, and by the 
same logic provides a reason for public ownership rather than use of PPPs:“ownership does matter when 
contracts are incomplete: … ownership gives the government special powers in the form of residual control 
rights.” 26 This is especially important in the case of public services, because the state can never transfer 
responsibility for the public interest that the service is serving, and so entering into long-term PPP contracts 
limit the state’s ability to respond to uncertain future changes in the public interest – the state is reducing its 
own powers to act. 27 
5.2. Renegotiation: unequal opportunities 
The Green Paper’s belief in complete contracts is repeated when it addresses the question of contract 
revisions. “In general, changes made in the course of the execution of a PPP, if not covered in the contract 
documents, usually have the effect of calling into question the principle of equality of treatment of economic 
operators. ……… any substantial modification relating to the actual subject-matter of the contract must be 
considered equivalent to the conclusion of a new contract, requiring a new competition” (para  49).   
 
                                                     
22  IMF PPPs , section VII, para 48, p.28 
23  The IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and the related Manual on Fiscal 
Transparency require statements as part of the budget documentation that describe the nature 
and significance of all contingent liabilities. 
24  OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency; IPSAS 19, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets, issued by IFAC; GFSM 2001. 
25 IMF, PPPs, para  78 and footnote 74, pp 38-39, referring to The Times, July 7, 2003 
26 Oliver Hart. Incomplete Contracts And Public Ownership: Remarks, And An Application To Public-Private 
Partnerships. The Economic Journal, 113 (March), C69–C76.  
27  Julie Froud,  “The Private Finance Initiative: risk, uncertainty and the state”, Accounting, Organizations and Society 
28 (2003) 567–589 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
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This need for constant renegotiation is often seen as an opportunity for the private partner to improve the 
terms of their contract, but for the public partner it is normally disadvantageous, partly because of the greater 
knowledge and legal expertise of the private companies leads to contract revisions more favorable to the 
contractor. In France, which has the longest experience of such concessions to build roads, water works and 
other infrastructure, an official report observed that the system “left elected councillors on their own, without 
support, to deal with conglomerates wielding immense political, economic and financial power” 28 
 
The Green Paper’s solution is hardly practicable however: if every substantive revision has to be retendered, 
then PPPs will become so uncertain that private companies will lose interest. This real problem should rather 
be addressed in a comparative evaluation of PPP proposals with other public sector option: the risk to the 
public authority of this kind of future deterioration in the terms of the contract has to be quantified. 
 
5.3. Uncertainty of outcome: secrets, corruption, lies and mistrust 
The uncertainty of the future is compounded because of strategic behaviour by the companies designed to 
improve their own position, and exploit omissions and failures by public authorities. There is real experience 
of these problems – none of them noted by the Green Paper. 
 
PFI schemes in the UK show common exaggeration of costs or reduction in quality.  An official audit report 
on PFI in schools warned that expected savings were not being delivered, and that “there is a strong case for 
changing capital funding incentives to enable options other than PFI to be pursued equally advantageously. 
This would open up the PFI mechanism itself to competition”29: one PFI project to improve schools in north 
London resulted in an extra costs of £6.25m for the council, due to lack of provision for items like desks, 
chairs and cabling for computers.30 With hospitals, the cost of PFI schemes has invariably been higher than 
originally forecast, requiring 30% cuts in bed capacity and 20% reductions in staff in hospitals financed 
through PFI. 31 
 
Corruption is a common problem with public sector contracts, and PPPs are at least as susceptible as others. 
The Portuguese hospital PPP, Amadora-Sintra has been the subject of allegations of over-charging, use of 
fraudulent expense claims (a state auditor in mid-2003 found over-charging of €75m, although an arbitration 
court controversially overturned this), and allegations of misuse of hospital property for private clinical 
services, reinforced by the fact that the contract with the hospital was signed in 1995 by the outgoing health 
minister, who, after the electoral defeat of the government, subsequently went to work for the de Mello 
Group which was the private partner in the hospital.32 In water, executives of the major groups Suez and 
Veolia have been convicted of corruption in Grenoble, Angouleme and Reunion (France) and in Milan 
(Italy).33  
 
The impact of strategic behaviour by companies has also been demonstrated in a global study of 
infrastructure construction contracts for railways. The study found that the actual final cost of these contracts 
was always consistently far higher than the original estimates: a statistical analysis confirmed that the one 
coherent explanation of this phenomenon is “systematic lying” on the part of the companies. 34  
                                                     
28  “Cour des Comptes: La gestion des services publics locaux d’eau et d’assainissement”, in Rapport public particulier, 
(Janvier 1997), http://www.ccomptes.fr/Cour-des-comptes/publications/rapports/eau/cdc72.htm  
29 Audit Commission: PFI in Schools 30 Jan 2003  
http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/subject.asp?CatID=ENGLISH^LG^SUBJECT^LG-EDU   
30 A costly free lunch. Melanie McFadyean and David Rowland   The Guardian   Tuesday July 30, 2002  
31 BMJ 2002;324:1205-1209 ( 18 May ) Private finance and "value for money" in NHS hospitals: a policy in search of a 
rationale? Allyson M Pollock, Jean Shaoul, and Neil Vickers. This article contains references to many other detailed 
critiques of PFI.  
32 Pravda online, 11 July 2003, “BLOCO EXIGE RESCISÃO DO CONTRATO DO AMADORA SINTRA”, 
http://port.pravda.ru/portugal/2003/07/11/2564.html  
33   Private to Public: International lessons of water re-municipalisation in Grenoble, France. Lobina and Hall. PSIRU.  
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2001-08-W-Grenoble.doc  
34 Underestimating costs in public works projects: Error or lie? by Bent Flyvbjerg; Journal of the American Planning 
Association; Summer 2002; Vol. 68, Issue 3; pg. 279  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
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A recent study of the use of PPPs in defence  in the UK concluded that PPPs do not necessarily lead to  
efficiency gains and that there are significant costs and disadvantages: “The conclusion of the analysis is that 
the use of PPPs will not necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency in defence procurement and that 
considerable care will need to be taken both in terms of negotiating PPPs, monitoring their performance, 
and in their renewal. The UK defence sector illustrates that PPPs involve significant transaction costs which 
must be set against any benefits in terms of economic efficiency incentives”35.  
5.4. Damage to staff: working conditions, morale and public service ethos 
One effect of PPPs is often to damage the working conditions and morale of workers.  A survey carried out 
by EPSU found that in a number of countries workers were displaced outside sectoral agreements on pay and 
conditions, or forced onto worse conditions.36 The development of outsourcing in energy has displaced 
workers from mainstream energy companies to contractors who have an incentive to cut costs to retain the 
next contract: as a result there is a training crisis throughout Europe for energy workers. 37 
 
Damaging effects on labour have been noted by a number of reports of experience with PPPs in the UK.  A 
recent review of the impact of PPPs on labour in the UK observed that the tendering process, based on 
lowest price, had damaged the security and conditions of the workforce, especially of women, as well as the 
quality of service; in the case of prison service PFI schemes, the effect had been to reduce wages, increase 
hours, and increase staff turnover. 38 The study of UK defence contracts (see above) found that there had 
been damaging consequences for staff morale. 39  And a similar result emerged from a study of PPPs in the 
health and municipal services sectors in the UK: “a vicious circle of monitoring and distrust between partner 
organizations, in place of the old faith in bureaucratic process”. The study also concluded that PPPs  present 
a significant threat to the ‘public service ethos’. 40    
5.5. Eternal concessions 
The Green Paper states that a fixed contract length has to be set to provide a form of guarantee for the private 
partner in PPPs – the longer the better, for the private partner: “the period during which the private partner 
will undertake the performance of a work or a service must be fixed in terms of the need to guarantee the 
economic and financial stability of a project.” (para 46). Certainly, public services and those that work in 
them benefit from security and stability, an environment that facilitates service delivery: public sector 
operations in general can provide this stability.  However, fixing contract length in a PPP creates risks for the 
public sector that are not present if the work is done by the public sector itself. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/planning/128776261.html?did=128776261&FMT=ABS&FMTS=FT:TG:PAGE&desc=Un
derestimating+costs+in+public+works+projects:++Error+or+lie%3f  
35 Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private partnerships: a case study of UK defence David Parker 
and Keith Hartley Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management  
Volume 9, Issue 3 , May 2003, Pages 97-108 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=JournalURL&_cdi=12893&_auth=y&_acct=C000027518&_version=1&_u
rlVersion=0&_userid=634187&md5=c5218be5e9f78f1fd27ddb01b951c843 
36 EPSU Survey on PPPs 2004 
37 Restructuring and outsourcing of electricity distribution in EU. Thomas and Hall. PSIRU 
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-05-E-distriboutsource.doc 
38 Paying the cost? Public Private Partnerships and the public service workforce. By Sanjiv Sachdev. June 2004. 
Catalyst. http://www.catalystforum.org.uk/pdf/ppp.pdf  
39 Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private partnerships: a case study of UK defence David Parker 
and Keith Hartley Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management  
Volume 9, Issue 3 , May 2003, Pages 97-108 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=JournalURL&_cdi=12893&_auth=y&_acct=C000027518&_version=1&_u
rlVersion=0&_userid=634187&md5=c5218be5e9f78f1fd27ddb01b951c843 
40 PPPs and the changing public sector ethos: case-study evidence from the health and local  authority sectors . Gail 
Hebson, Damian Grimshaw, Manchester School of Management, Mick Marchington  
Work, employment and society Volume 17 n Number 3 n September 2003 
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One such risk, implicitly acknowledged in the Green Paper,  is the risk of the private company having no 
incentive to work efficiently, because it will not be exposed to competition for a long time.  The paper  
makes the obscure suggestion that “An excessive duration is likely to be censured on the basis of the 
principles governing the internal market or the provisions of the Treaty governing competition” (para  46), 
but does not say by whom it will be censored, or what sanctions will be applied. PPPs which are in effect 
eternal already exist in the EU: the Barcelona water concession has been running continuously for 136 years, 
without ever being retendered, and there is now no prospect of it being competitively tendered because the 
costs of compensation to the incumbent are too high.  In the UK, all the private water companies hold 
monopoly concessions which now require 25 years notice of termination: it is very unlikely that in practice 
such notice can ever be given effectively.   
 
A second risk is not noted in the Green Paper but is very real: the risk that terminating the contract early will 
be impossibly costly because of  compensation claims. An example is the experience of the Hungarian city 
of Szeged, where water supply was privatized under a concession PPP involving the French multinational 
Veolia. After a few years the municipality re-evaluated the scheme, which had legal flaws, and found it 
would be cheaper and preferable to carry it out in-house. The change proved impossible however as Veolia 
brought a court case for compensation equivalent to all expected profits from the remainder of the contract. 
Szeged had to settle for renegotiation with Veolia. 41 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
There appears to be no coherent overview being taken of PPPs by the Commission. DG Economy is raising 
concerns about the dangers of PPPs, especially when used to avoid fiscal restraints, whereas DG Markt (and 
Eurostat) are encouraging them for exactly this purpose.  DG Regio spends large amounts of time and energy 
explaining how PPPs can be arranged in central Europe and still be eligible for cohesion funds, while being 
more aware than most of the risks and problems involved. The Green Paper itself follows a rigorous tunnel 
vision principle: DG Markt is concerned with ensuring competition and extending the internal market in 
public services, and has no responsibility at all for the public services themselves, those who work within 
them, or the evaluation of public sector and PPP options. 
 
Despite some helpful suggestions in relation to tendering of concessions, this is not the paper on PPPs  that 
Europe needs.  The Commission should find a way of producing a report that includes: 
- the risks and problems experienced with PPPs 
- the dangers for public authorities in entering into long-term deals with the private sector 
- the need to protect public services and their workers from erosion of quality by commercial 
opportunism 
- the economic and social case for public sector investment and provision of services. 
 
  
                                                     
41 Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience. Emanuele Lobina e.lobina@gre.ac.uk and David 
Hall d.j.hall@gre.ac.uk . June 2003. www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc  
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7. Annexe: extracts from papers 
7.1. Hart on contradictions with theory of firm 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP: REMARKS, AND AN APPLICATION TO 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS Oliver Hart.  The Economic Journal, 113 (March), C69–C76. _  
 
“…the issues of vertical integration and privatisation have much more in common than not. Both are 
concerned with whether it is better to regulate a relationship via an arms-length contract or via a transfer of 
ownership. Given this, one might have expected the literatures to have developed along similar lines. 
However, this is not so. Whereas much of the recent literature on the theory of the firm takes an ‘incomplete’ 
contracting perspective, in which inefficiencies arise because it is hard to foresee and contract about the 
uncertain future, much of the privatisation literature has taken a ‘complete’ contracting perspective, in which 
imperfections arise solely because of moral hazard or asymmetric information.  
……. this is unfortunate. One of the insights of the recent literature on the firm is that, if the only 
imperfections are those arising from moral hazard or asymmetric information, organisational form – 
including ownership and firm boundaries – does not matter: an owner has no special power or rights since 
everything is specified in an initial contract (at least among the things that can ever be specified). In contrast, 
ownership does matter when contracts are incomplete: the owner of an asset or firm can then make all 
decisions concerning the asset or firm that are not included in an initial contract (the owner has ‘residual 
control rights’).  
Applying this insight to the privatisation context yields the conclusion that in a complete contracting world 
the government does not need to own a firm to control its behaviour: any goals – economic or otherwise – 
can be achieved via a detailed initial contract. However, if contracts are incomplete, as they are in practice, 
there is a case for the government to own an electricity company or prison since ownership gives the 
government special powers in the form of residual control rights.”   
 
7.2. Parker and Hartley on risks and defence PPPs in UK 
Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private partnerships: a case study of UK defence David 
Parker and Keith Hartley Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management  
Volume 9, Issue 3 , May 2003, Pages 97-108 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=JournalURL&_cdi=12893&_auth=y&_acct=C000027518&_ver
sion=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=634187&md5=c5218be5e9f78f1fd27ddb01b951c843 
 
Organisational boundaries are becoming much more fluid, involving networking, joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, partnership sourcing, and the like ([Van Tulder (1999]). PPPs including in the UK PFIs are part of 
this new ‘relational contracting’ environment aimed at reducing costs, speeding up time to market, and 
promoting innovation. They involve a change in the boundary of government, blurring the distinction 
between public and private provision. Not surprisingly, the early entrants to PPP contracts in the UK 
‘tendered on the basis that the political risks were high and construction costs were likely to overrun……’ ( 
[Financial Times, 6 April 2000b]).  
PPP is a new policy initiative in need of economic analysis and evaluation. The paper has developed a 
framework for assessing PPPs drawing on transaction cost theory, supplemented by resource-based theory 
and an understanding of the roles of reputation and trust in contracting. The implications from this 
framework have been considered using a case study of the UK defence sector. The defence sector was 
chosen because it has been a leading user of PPP/PFI initiatives in recent years and, prima facie, involves a 
number of significant problems for long-term contracting given the uncertainties surrounding defence from 
both supply and demand perspectives.  
PPPs involve agreeing long-term contracts characterised by incompleteness in their specification, asset 
specificity and scope for opportunism because of asymmetric information. The case study has highlighted a 
number of major potential transaction costs in defence procurement, arising from incomplete information, 
asset specificity and the resulting scope for opportunistic behaviour, which cannot be obviously offset by 
developing trust relationships. It has particularly illustrated the tensions between competition to reduce costs, 
the need for contractors to generate profits, and the building of partnerships and trust. The study has also 
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drawn attention to motivation in the public sector. PPPs can be distorted by the incentives within the Armed 
Forces; it does not necessarily follow that military personnel will behave efficiently. They neither share in 
any profits from efficient behaviour or experience losses from poor performance. Military personnel may 
pursue their own utility, shunning those schemes that adversely affect their own status.  
The conclusion of the analysis is that the use of PPPs will not necessarily lead to improved economic 
efficiency in defence procurement and that considerable care will need to be taken both in terms of 
negotiating PPPs, monitoring their performance, and in their renewal. The UK defence sector illustrates that 
PPPs involve significant transaction costs which must be set against any benefits in terms of economic 
efficiency incentives. This conclusion has significance going beyond the defence sector to other forms of 
PPPs sharing the same sort of uncertainties, both in the UK and internationally. The study suggests that the 
costs and benefits of PPPs must be carefully balanced against the costs and benefits of more traditional forms 
of public sector procurement. Future research could usefully focus on better quantification of PPP costs and 
benefits and identification of the circumstances in which information asymmetry problems can be overcome 
by developing true partnership relationships.  
7.3. Hebson et al on ethos 
 
PPPs and the changing public sector ethos: case-study evidence from the health and local  authority sectors . 
Gail Hebson, Damian Grimshaw, Manchester School of Management, Mick Marchington  
Work, employment and society Volume 17 n Number 3 n September 2003 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article explores the extent to which a new contractual approach to delivering  public services, through 
public private partnerships (PPPs), is transforming the  traditional values underpinning the public sector 
ethos among both managers and  workers. Drawing on two detailed case studies of PPPs – a Private Finance  
Initiative in the health sector and the outsourcing of housing benefit claims in the  local government sector – 
we identify a range of new pressures impacting on five  key elements of a traditional notion of the public 
sector ethos. Our findings  demonstrate that the contractual relations of PPPs have led to a clear weakening  
of traditional notions of managerial accountability and bureaucratic behaviour,  reflecting both a shift to new 
lines of accountability (private sector shareholders)  and a vicious circle of monitoring and distrust between 
partner organizations, in  place of the old faith in bureaucratic process. Among workers, certain traditional  
values – especially a concern for working in the public interest – continue to  inform the way they identify 
with, and understand, their work in delivering public  services. However, the cost cutting and work 
intensification associated with PPPs  present a significant threat to these values. The article identifies 
examples of short-term  resilience of the traditional public sector ethos, as well as developments that  
threaten its long-term survival.  
 
Discussion and conclusions   
Our case-study evidence demonstrates that the contractual arrangements  accompanying PPPs have exerted 
transformative pressures on the traditional  public sector ethos. By exploring the five principles identified by 
Pratchett and  Wingfield, this article isolates specific pressures that may challenge the public  sector ethos as 
well as reasons why it may be more or less resilient to change.  Interviews with managers reveal that 
principles of accountability and  bureaucratic behaviour are threatened under PPPs. The transparency in 
decision- making that is the hallmark of accountability and bureaucratic behaviour,  albeit often at the price 
of time-consuming structures, has been replaced with  contract-led decision structures that are negotiated and 
fought over. Although  managers may not have always agreed with decisions in the past, they were  
respected because they were made in accordance with impartial rules governing  traditional public 
administration. Such respect for decisions has withered.  Instead, decisions are openly questioned, with a 
view among managers that it is  the most strategic (and, perhaps, opportunistic) partner that wins.  Private 
and public sector managers have conflicting priorities, and this  encourages manipulation and strategic 
behaviour. The contract limits the  opportunities for high trust relationships, since one partner is responsible 
for  monitoring the contract and this inevitably leads the other to use their expertise  to evade this. There is 
also greater scope for managerial discretion, which  facilitates an abuse of trust. In both case studies, there 
was an initial sense of  mutual trust, but as this broke down public sector managers intensified  monitoring 
practices and adapted their behaviour in order to secure ‘value  for money’. Faced with this evidence, the 
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optimistic view that private sector  managers will learn from their public sector counterparts (OPSR, 2002) is  
misplaced. Instead public sector managers mimic private sector techniques  and so threaten the traditional 
values of accountability and bureaucratic  behaviour.  Among non-managerial workers transferred to the 
private sector, the evidence  is less clear-cut. One might expect the public sector ethos to erode as it  has 
always been premised on a two-way relationship – the provision of certain  working conditions in exchange 
for a specific form of commitment. Indeed, our  evidence demonstrates that workers have experienced a 
decline in working conditions  and there has been some weakening of values associated with a public  sector 
ethos. In particular, notions of loyalty have changed, with greater emphasis  on loyalty to ‘the service’ and 
less to either the public sector as former  employer (now as client) or their new private sector employer. But 
workers’ values  of public interest and altruistic motivation seem relatively resilient.  Emphasis on 
contractual performance targets often conflicts with workers’ customary  emphasis on working for the public 
interest. Examples of such conflicts,  together with evidence that workers often negotiate ways around strict 
performance  targets, suggests that the principle of public interest and altruistic motivation  have not been 
eroded. 
 
8. Annex: definitions of PPPs 
8.1.  EC DG Markt Green Paper 30 April 2004 : 
 
“The “public-private partnership” phenomenon 
1. The term public-private partnership ("PPP") is not defined at Community level. In general, the term refers 
to forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business which aim to ensure the 
funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a 
service. 
2. The following elements normally characterise PPPs: 
• The relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation between the public partner and the 
private partner on different aspects of a planned project.  
• The method of funding the project, in part from the private sector, sometimes by means of complex 
arrangements between the various players. Nonetheless, public funds - in some cases rather substantial - may 
be added to the private funds. 
• The important role of the economic operator, who participates at different stages in the project (design, 
completion, implementation, funding). The public partner concentrates primarily on defining the objectives 
to be attained in terms of public interest, quality of services provided and pricing policy, and it takes 
responsibility for monitoring compliance with these objectives. 
• The distribution of risks between the public partner and the private partner, to whom the risks generally 
borne by the public sector are transferred. However, a PPP does not necessarily mean that the private partner 
assumes all the risks, or 
even the major share of the risks linked to the project. The precise distribution of risk is determined case by 
case, according to the respective ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk.” 
(1.1, p.3) 
8.2. EC DG ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS Public finances in EMU 2003 
 
“There is no unambiguous definition of what constitutes a PPP. Broadly speaking, PPPs concern the transfer 
to the private sector of investment projects that traditionally have been executed or financed by the public 
sector (see, for example, Grout, 1997). Four elements, however, seem required to qualify PPPs:  
• the project should concern the construction or the operation of physical assets in areas characterised by a 
strong public function (for example, transport, urban development, security, etc) and involve the public 
sector (general government) as the principal purchaser. Although PPPs are especially relevant in transport 
infrastructure, examples of public–private partnerships can be found in the provision of defence, health, 
education and cultural services, the building and operation of prisons or the area of water and waste 
management;  
• the PPP must involve a corporation outside the general government (normally a private corporation) as the 
principal operator, that is, the agent that carries out the project;  
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• the principal finance of the project should not come from public debt but from other sources, such as 
private bonds;  
• by way of the partnership, the way the project is executed must change compared with the alternative of 
pure public supply. This means that in PPPs, the private operator provides significant inputs in the design 
and conception of the project and bears a relevant amount of risk.”  (5.3, p.128)  
8.3. IMF: Public-Private Partnerships March 12, 2004  
 
“9. A typical PPP takes the form of a design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) scheme. 
Under such a scheme, the government specifies the services it wants the private sector to deliver, and then 
the private partner designs and builds a dedicated asset for that purpose, finances its construction, and 
subsequently operates the asset and provides the services deriving from it. This contrasts with traditional 
public investment where the government contracts with the private sector to build an asset but the design and 
financing is provided by the government. In most cases, the government then operates the asset once it is 
built. The difference between these two approaches reflects a belief that giving the private sector combined 
responsibility for designing, building, financing, and operating an asset is a source of the increased efficiency 
in service delivery that justifies PPPs.  
10. The government is in many cases the main purchaser of services provided under  a PPP. These 
services can be purchased either for the government’s own use, as an input to provide another service, or on 
behalf of final consumers; a prison, a school, and a free-access road would fall into these respective 
categories. Private operators also sell services directly to the public, as with a toll road or railway. Such an 
arrangement is often referred to as a concession, and the private operator of a concession (the concessionaire) 
pays the government a concession fee and/or a share of profits.” (3A, p.7) 
8.4. PSIRU Terminology of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) March 2003 
In terms of getting an overview and an international comparison, it is useful to divide the elements that can 
make up a PPP scheme into four parts: Construction, Operation, Finance and Ownership (see Table 1 below).  
 
Outsourcing of services just involves a contract to operate a specific service, e.g. refuse collection, without 
any construction or financing of a capital investment. Under UK PFI schemes (private finance initiative)a 
private company designs and builds specific investments on the basis of finance provided by it, and recoups 
the money by a contract to provide services for a period of years, usually decades, while the asset itself 
remains owned by the public sector.  Concessions e.g. in water are similar, but the finance is recouped 
through charges to the users. With leases (affermage in French) the company does not make its own 
investments but operates and maintains the system for the municipality, financed by charging users. Under 
BOT schemes (build, operate, transfer.), the investment asset is built and owned by the company for the 
period of operation, and later transferred to the public sector. …” (section 2.1) 
 
Table 1: Elements of different PPP schemes 
  Out-
sourcing 
PFI Concession Lease BOT 
Operation Operation of service X X X X X 
Finance Capital investment financed by 
private operator 
 X X  X 
 Recouped by user charges    X X  
 Recouped by contract from 
municipality 
X X   X 
Construction Construction of asset by private 
company 
 X X  X 
Ownership public during and after contract X X X X  
 private during contract, public after   X  X 
 Private indefinitely      
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9. Annex: extracts on PPPs from EMU report 2003 
 
5.3 Public-private partnerships  
5.3.1 Definition, taxonomy, and recent experiences The involvement of private sector corporations to build 
and operate public projects has become an increasingly widespread practice in EU countries.  The rationale 
for the use of PPP schemes is rather that of microeconomic efficiency. Even assuming that competitive 
tenders for the selection of private counterparts are feasible and efficient, pure privatisation schemes may not 
be optimal when there are reasons that justify a form of control on the design of the project by the public 
sector. This is the case when the project concerns the delivery of pure public goods (e.g., a prison), when 
externalities are particularly relevant (e.g., when projects have a considerable environmental impact) or when 
the distributive consequences of the project are a major concern (e.g., the provision of health facilities). In 
those cases regulation mechanisms may not    be sufficient to ensure that public objectives are satisfactorily 
met. The standard alternatives are direct public provision or public procurement through competitive tenders. 
In many instances public procurements (contracting out) guarantees higher cost efficiency than direct public 
provisions.126 In both alternatives, however, it is the public sector that provides the financial funds to carry 
out the project and that exercise the control on the design of the asset. PPP schemes offer a third alternative. 
In such a case, the finance of the project is provided by the private sector, as in privatisation schemes, but the 
public sector plays a relevant role as client of the services provided by the asset. In particular, PPP contracts 
may specify that the private operator will be remunerated only if the actual supply of services is judged to be 
successful. The fact that the object of PPP contracts is the supply of services rather than the provision of the 
asset can make a major difference with respect to public procurement schemes. Specifying and monitoring 
the desired characteristics of services is normally easier than specifying and monitoring those of assets. Thus, 
contracts that have as their object the flow of services rather than the build of assets help to reduce the 
incentives that the private supplier may have to cut on quality, while preserving the incentives to contain 
costs (Grout, 1997). 127      
5.3.3  Contingent liabilities normally arise when in PPP contracts governments offer a guarantee to the debt 
issued by the private operator to finance the project. Public guarantees do not constitute effective 
government liabilities because there is no certainty that they will translate into increased debt in the future. 
However, this may be the case if certain contingencies occur, i.e., in the case of default of the private 
counterpart. Since with public guarantees there is no certainty concerning the impact on public debt, they are 
recognised only under cash accounting, if and when the contingent event (the PPP counterpart default) 
actually occurs and payment is made.  
 
125 The conditions under which external constraints on budget deficits can effectively reduce public 
investment have been discussed in section 5.2.1. 126 The reasons are well-known (see, e.g., Domberger and 
Jensen (1997) for a survey). In particular, bureaucracy theories suggest that government officials tend to 
focus on objectives different than that of cost minimization (e.g. maximising the size of their budget). 127 
Hart Shleifer and Vishny (1997) develop an incompletecontracts model of public procurement and show that, 
compared with direct public provisions, private operators will in general have higher incentives to keep costs 
low but lower incentives to keep quality high. They provide supporting evidence in the context of prisons in 
the US. 
   
10. Annex: selected provisions of new procurement directive 
DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts Official Journal of the European Union EN 30.4.2004 L 134/133  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_134/l_13420040430en01140240.pdf  
 
The coverage of the directive is defined by reference to two lists of services attached in the annexes. Article 
20 says that services listed in the first annexe, IIA, (referred to in the Green Paper para 11 as “defined as 
having priority”) have to be subject to public tendering open to companies from all member states, governed 
by the rules in articles 23-55; those listed in the second annexe, IIB, (referred to in the Green Paper para 11 
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as “non-priority”) are subject only to the requirement of  article 35(4)to report the contract. These lists and 
phrases are unchanged from the first directive on procurement of services, EC 92/50.  
   
ANNEX II A (1) 
1 Maintenance and repair services  
2 Land transport services , including armoured car services, and courier services, except transport of mail  
3 Air transport services of passengers and freight, except transport of mail  
4 Transport of mail by land and by air  
5 Telecommunications services  
6 Financial services: (a) Insurance services (b) Banking and investment services  
7 Computer and related services  
8 Research and development services  
9 Accounting, auditing and bookkeeping services  
10 Market research and public opinion polling services  
11 Management consulting services (6) and related services  
12 Architectural services; engineering services and integrated engineering services; urban planning and 
landscape engineering services; related scientific and technical consulting services; technical testing and 
analysis services  
13 Advertising services  
14 Building-cleaning services and property management services  
15 Publishing and printing services on a fee or contract basis  
16 Sewage and refuse disposal services; sanitation and similar services  
 
ANNEX II B 
17 Hotel and restaurant services  
18 Rail transport services  
19 Water transport services  
20 Supporting and auxiliary transport services 
21 Legal services  
22 Personnel placement and supply services  
23 Investigation and security services, except armoured car services 
24 Education and vocational education services 
25 Health and social services  
26 Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
27 Other services   (2) Except contracts for the acquisition, development, production or co-production of 
programmes by broadcasting organisations and contracts for broadcasting time. 
 
